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This paper studies the eﬀects of a monetary shock on real and nominal variables, such
as output, inﬂation and especially unemployment, within a framework which combines a New
Keynesian business cycle model model with microfounded labor market in the style of the
search and matching literature. We assume that unemployed workers can lose their skill over
time and show that this mechanism helps explain the slugish response of unemployment to
monetary shocks observed in the data, while also replicating the behavior of output, inﬂation
and employment.
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1I n t r o d u c t i o n
In recent research advances, a new emphases has been placed on the need to study deeper the link
between labor market variables, real variables and nominal shocks (Cooley and Quadrini (1999),
Trigari (2003)). Models in which labor markets are not developed, like the ones where only hours
vary but not the number of workers employed, cannot capture the sluggishness with which output
and inﬂation respond to shocks. A successful candidate to enrich the labor market description in real
business cycle models seems to be the search and matc h i n gf r a m e w o r kal aM o r t e n s e na n dP i s s a r i d e s
(1994). Several papers consider search and matching in a real business cycle model and are able
to improve the performance of the standard model when compared with the empirical evidence
(Merz (1995), Andolfatto (1996) and den Hann, Ramey and Watson (2000)). Two papers which
are closely related to ours are Cooley and Quadrini (1999), who integrate a search and matching
model with a limited partecipation model, and Trigari (2003), who integrates a neokeynesian model
with a search model. The latter is particularly successful at replicating the respose of several real
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1and nominal variables after a monetary shock. Her framework allows her to analyze the variations
of the labor market’s extensive margin, number of workers employed, and the intensive margin,
number of hours, as well as the performance of output and inﬂation. A similar framework is also
used by Walsh (2003).
There is also part a diﬀerent set of papers which claim that the persistence of business cycles
and in particular of unemployment, is due to heterogeneities existent in the unemployment pool.
One such heterogeneity is the lengh of the unemployment spell, which some empirical studies
connect with the probability of ﬁnding job. Jackman and Layard (1991) ﬁnd that the exit rate
from unemployment decreases when there is a higher proportion of long term unemployed. Bover,
Arellano and Bentolila (2002) show that for the Spanish economy the probability to ﬁnd a job
decreases with the duration of unemployment. Moreover, due to the fact that long term unemployed
are detached from a productive environment for long periods, there seems to be a positive correlation
between the length of the unemployment spell and the probability to lose the skill.
The loss of the skill mechanism has been used to explain the diﬀerences between the European
and US labor market. In particular Sargent and Liungquist (1997) explain the importance of
diﬀerent labor market institutions that enhance the probability to lose the skill for long term
unemployed. More recently Esteban-Pretel (2004) shows that a real business cycle model with
microfunded labor market composed by workers with two diﬀerent skills can generate a sluggish
behavior in the real variables after a TFP shock. The probability to lose the skill and the cost for
a ﬁrm to retrain a worker makes the low skill unemployed less attractive and drives these longer
cycles. The author shows that the model is even more ﬁtted to explain economies in which the
ratio between low and high skilled workers is high 1. The model used does not incorporate money
and pricing decisions. Hence monetary policy is non-existent.
In this paper we extend the work of Esteban-Pretel to account for a richer business cycle
economy in order to study the eﬀects of monetary policy on real and nominal variables. We present
an economy composed by inﬁnitely lived risk-averse individuals, which decide how to best allocate
their wealth between consumption, savings and money holdings, which they will need to make
their transactions. They supply labor to intermediate goods ﬁrms, which produce an homogenous
good to be sold to the retailers. Firms in the latter sector operate in monopolistic and price their
good over their marginal cost. However they are constraint in how often they can change their
prices, behavior which follows a Calvo type rule. These retail goods are ultimately purchased by
consumers. The monetary authority sets the nominal interest rate following a taylor rule.
We calibrate the model to match the main features of the US labor market, then we simulate the
responses of output, inﬂation and employment and diﬀerent types of unemployement to an interest
rate shock and we compare them with what happens in the data. The model matches closely the
shape and magnitude of the response of output, inﬂation and unemployment and it improves the
performance in the persistence of these variables after a nominal shock with respect to the results
of the literature. The loss of skill mechanism, combined with the nominal and real rigidities, helps
the model to match the response of the labor market variables. In particular unemployment and
its long and short-term components.
1He shows that calibrating the model to match some empirical facts of Spanish and US labor markets, the eﬀect
of the loss of skill creates longer cycles for the Spanish than for the US economy, as seen in the data.
2The model abstracts from the possibility of having labor force participation decisions, which is
a natural extansion to model. Letting the workers decide whether to actively search for a job or be
inactive would improve the persistent reaction of the economy to nominal and real shocks
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the VAR approach
considered and analyzes the responses of output, inﬂation and some labor market variables.to a
federal fund shock; section 3 develops the model; section 4 illustrates the results of the simulations
of the model and compares them to the empirical evidence and section 5 concludes.
2 The empirical evidence
In this section we discuss the strategy used to estimate the eﬀects of a monetary policy shock
and we describe the eﬀects of a nominal shock on output, inﬂation, unemployment (such as total
unemployment rate, long term and short term unemployment rate) and the employment rate.
2.1 VAR approach
In our estimation analysis we make the assumption that the monetary authority uses the following
rule to set its instrument:
St = f(Ωt)+εs
t
where St is the instrument of monetary policy, f(Ωt) a linear function of the information set
available to monetary authority in a given period t and εs
t is the monetary shock (the standard
deviation is assumed to be 1). In order to determine the eﬀects of monetary policy we base our
estimation strategy on the recursiveness assumption (Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2000))
according to which monetary policy shocks are orthogonal to the information set of the monetary
authority.
Deﬁne Zt as the vector of all the variables under consideration. A reduced form VAR for a
k-dimensional vector Zt is given by:
Zt = B1 + B2Zt−1 + B3Zt−2 + ... + Bq+1Zt−q + ut (1)
Consistent estimates of Bi can be obtained running a OLS equation by equation of (1). Since
each element of ut reﬂects the eﬀects of all fundamental economic shocks, there is no need to
identify one particular element of ut as a monetary shock. In order to identify the shocks, the
relationship between the VAR disturbances and the fundamental economic shocks, εt, is assumed
to be A0ut = εt,w h e r eA0 is a k × k invertible matrix. Premultiplying eq.(1) by A0 we obtain:
A0Zt = A1 + A2Zt−1 + A2Zt−2 + ... + Aq+1Zt−q + εt
where Bi = A−1
0 Ai. Deﬁne γh t h er e s p o n s eo fZt+h to a unit shock in εt and it can be computed as
the solution of the diﬀerence equation:
γh = B1 ++ B2γh−1 + B3γh−2 + ... + Bq+1γh−q,h=1 ,2...
with initial condition γ0 = Ik
3Then
e γh = γhA−1
0 ,h=1 ,2...
is the impulse response function of the elements of Zt to the elements of εt. In order to compute
the impulse response it is necessary to know A0 and in particular it is necessary to impose some
restriction on A0.









where X1t of k1 variables whose contemporaneous values appear in the information set Ωt, St,t h e
instrument of monetary policy and X2t of k2 variables which appear only with a lag in Ωt.
Under the recursiveness assumption it is suﬃcient to restrict A0 to be lower triangular with
positive terms on the diagonal to identify the dynamic responses of Zt to a monetary policy shock.
2.2 To the data
In this subsection we take a VAR to the data. We choose X1t to be composed by measures of output,
inﬂation, short term unemployment rate, long term unemployment rate, total unemployment rate
and employment rate. St is the nominal interest rate of the US economy (federal funds rate). We
set X2t =0and the make the assumption that the monetary policy can have a complete information
of the economy observing all the variables at the same time when the monetary policy is chosen.
T h et i m es a m p l ei sf r o mt h eﬁrst quarter of 1979 to the third quarter of 2003. We have chosen
this sample because it has been estimated that since the Volker’s appointment, the FED followed
a stabilizing forward looking Taylor rule using the federal fund rate as an instrument of monetary
policy (Clarida et al 2000). The series for output is the log of the real gdp, the one for inﬂation
is the annualized quarterly change of the log of the implicit gdp deﬂator. The interest rate is the
quarterly average of the annualized monthly federal fund rate. Long term unemployment rate is
the log of the percentage of the people that have been unemployment for more than 6 months over
the total labor force. Short term unemployment rate is the log of the percentage of people over
the labor force that have been unemployed for less than 6 months. Total unemployment rate is
the log of the sum of the two previous series and total employment rate is the log of the ratio of
total employment and total labor force. We have chosen these last series to be a rate rather than a
level in order to compare more closely the performance of the model with the data results. For the
sample period that we study, the average unemployment rate is 6.3 percent and roughly 15 percent
of total unemployment is long-term.
Given the data, we estimate a seven variables VAR and we examine the behavior of the variables
after a one percent increase in the federal fund rate. Figure 1 and 2 show the impulse responses of
real and nominal variables of the US economy to a 100 basis points positive shock to the interest
rates. The conﬁdence intervals are obtained by bootstrapping.
4Figure 1: Impulse Responses of Output, Inﬂation and Fed. Funds Rate of the US
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Figure 1 shows the well known behavior of output an inﬂation to a shock to interest rate. They
move only in the second period since we made the restriction that monetary policy can aﬀect only
with the lag the variables of the economy. Output drastically declines by 0.44 percent in the second
period after the shock and inﬂation rate by 0.16 percent in the ﬁfth period after the shock. Both
move back slowly to the steady state.
Figure 2 shows the eﬀects of the contractionaly monetary policy on the labor market variables.
Long-term unemployment suﬀers the biggest change following an increase in the federal funds rate
and also shows the higher persistence. It peaks in the sixth quarter, where the increase is 2.5
percent, and it takes longer than output to go back to the steady state. Short term unemployment
has its maximum in the fourth quarter, where the increase is 1.16 percent. Total unemployment
follows very closely the behavior of the short term unemployment, which is intuitive given that US
unemployment is mostly composed by workers who ﬁnd a job before the sixth month of unemploy-
ment. Total employment shows, as expected, a decrease (0.13 percent) and the mimimun point
5coincides with the peak of total unemployment, the forth quarter.
Figure 2: Impulse Responses of Employment and Unemployment of the US Economy
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One thing to note is that the VAR literature has not tradinionally used labor market variables
in its analysis. This paper has the aim to verify if a new Keynesian model augmented with a
microfounded labor market, is able to explain the behavior of these variables. In the next sections
we set up the model and compare the results with the evidence illustrated in this section.
3 The Model
We use a discrete time, dynamic general equilibrium model with four types of inﬁnitely lived
agents. Consumers/workers, intermediate goods ﬁrms, retail ﬁrms and the monetary authority.
The problem faced every one of them is explained in more detailed below.
63.1 Consumers
Consumers are inﬁnitely lived, risk averse agents. They are all assumed to belong to a big family,
which provides perfect self-insurance against variations in employment status and personal wealth.
This lets the problem of the consumer be solved as the one of a representative agent.
Every period the family chooses the level consumption, money holdings and bonds, to maximize
its life-time utility. Per period utility is a function of consumption, leisure and the utility obtained
by unemployed individuals, which can be interpreted as utility derived from home production. We
assume that there is persistence in the consumption of the family, which is modeled so that its
utility not only depends on the utility of the present period, but also on how much it changes from
the previous period.
We assume that the household needs money to make its transactions during the period. It
needs money to consume, buy bonds and pay the cost of the opened vacancies2.I tﬁnances these
expenditures with the money it carries from the previous period and from the interest on the bonds
from the previous period. At the end of the period wages are paid and proﬁts rebated, since ﬁrms
are own by the family. These resources will be transformed into money, which will be carried into
the following period.
Following Rotemberg and Woodford (1997), we make the assumption that the household makes
its optimal decision every period with the information set of two periods before. This is consistent
with the assumptions made in the identiﬁcation of the VAR and is needed to match the delays in
the response to a monetary shock of ouput, employment and unemployment observed in the data.
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for i = {0,...,∞}
where β ≤ 1 is the discount rate of the economy; γc < 1 and γn > 0 are the coeﬃcients of
risk aversion to ﬂuctuations in consumption and hours worked; e ≤ 1, is the habit persistence
coeﬃcient in consumption. nt is the number of employed workers, nt = nlt + nht; g(Lt+i) is the
disutility obtained by the family for supplying Lt+i units of labor. b is the home production of
those individuals who are not working; Bt is the number of nominal bonds purchased, and rn
t
the nominal interest rate in the economy. Mt are the nominal holdings of money. wT
t are the
t o t a la m o u n to fw a g e sp a i dt ot h ew o r k e r s .vt are the number of vacancies opened and k the ﬂow
2Firms are own by the consumers, so it is them who ultimately pay for the posting of vacancies.
7cost of every one of them. Πt+i = Π
f
t+i + Πr
t+i are the proﬁts rebated to the consumers from the
intermediate goods ﬁrms and the retailers3.Yt is the production of a single ﬁrm. and ﬁnally At is
the level of technology in the economy.
The problem of the household yields the following optimal conditions:
Euler equation, which shows how in equilibrium the household is indiﬀerent between saving or
consuming one more unit, since the marginal utility today equals the discounted marginal utility
tomorrow.
Et−2φt = βEt−2 (1 + rt)φt+1 (3)





and φt =( Ct − eCt−1)
−γ − βe(Ct+1 − eCt)
−γ
Cash in advance constraint, which
PtCt + Ptkvt = Mt (5)









































































for j ∈ {h.l}






































for j ∈ {h.l}.
8Budget Constraint - Money Demand
Mt+1 = PtYt − Ptˆ ηt − Ptttnlt (6)
3.2 Intermediate goods ﬁrms and workers
Intermediate goods ﬁrms produce goods which are sold to the retailers. They are price takers
and in order to produce, they need to engage in employment relationships with workers. These
relationships are composed of one ﬁrm and one worker.
Unemployed workers are assumed to be either high or low skilled. Workers who have just lost
their job retain their skill for some time. The loss of skill, which only happens while being out of
work, will occur with probability λ for the high skilled unemployed workers who have not matched
with a ﬁrm.
Firms can hire either type of unemployed worker. Both types are equally productive, although
the low skilled has to be trained during the ﬁrst period of employment. Training has a cost t,w h i c h
is shared between the worker and the ﬁrm. After the period of training the worker becomes high
skilled.
Vacant ﬁrms and unemployed workers meet randomly according to a matching function m(ut,v t),
where ut = ult +uht, ut is total unemployment, ult and uht are low and high skilled unemployment
respectively, and vt is the number of vacancies. The matching function is assumed to be constant











is the markettightness of the labor market.



















If the search process is successful, ﬁrms produce output according the production function
Yt = AtLυ
t where At is the level of technology of the economy and Lt the number of hours worked
by the employee. The costs of production for the ﬁrm are the wages, the cost of training if the
worker is low skilled and a ﬁxed cost ηt. This ﬁxed cost, which can be interpreted as the cost of
intermediate inputs other than labor, is idiosyncratic to the ﬁrm and independent and identically
distributed across ﬁrms and time, with distribution function F :[ 0 ,∞] → [0,1].A new cost is drawn
every period by the ﬁrm, and if the cost is high enough it may be beneﬁcial for the ﬁrm and the
worker to discontinue the employment relationship. The value of ηt which dissolves the match is
denoted by ¯ ηt a n di np r i n c i p l ei sd i ﬀerent for ﬁrms which hire high or low skilled workers, since
the latter have to pay the extra cost of training. Therefore the probability of job destruction is
1 − F (¯ ηht) and 1 − F (¯ ηlt) for high and low skilled workers respectively.
9Wages are determined as a Nash bargaining process over the surplus of the match, where βw
is the share of the surplus for the worker. The cost of training, which reduces the surplus of the
match with low skilled workers, is shared in the same manner.
A si nt h ec a s eo fc o n s u m e r s ,ﬁrms and workers take their decisions at period t using the
information available at t-2. Again, this assumption is made to be consistent with empirical evidence
presented earlier.
Let’s analyze now the present value of the diﬀerent states in which ﬁrms and workers can be.
3.2.1 Value of posting a vacancy
Firms post vacancies in the labor market and, when matched with a worker, implement optimal
production plans in order to maximize their proﬁts. Posting vacancies has a ﬂow cost of k for the








If the ﬁrm is matched, and the idiosyncratic shock is low enough, the following period the ﬁrm will
obtain the value of being ﬁlled by a worker of type i, otherwise it will remain as a vacancy. Denote
by Vt and Jit (ηt) the values, measured in terms of consumption, of having a vacancy opened and
of a match for a ﬁrm which hires worker of type i. Hence the value of a vacancy is






















































































3.2.2 Value of a ﬁlled job for a ﬁrm




























10The interpretation of the previous equation is as follows. During the current period, given the
ﬁrm’s idiosyncratic cost of intermediate inputs, ηt, it produces output, sells it to the ﬁnal good
ﬁrms at price xt and pays wages and the cost of these inputs. Since it all happens at the end of the
period and will only give utility to the consumers in the following period, in order to obtain their
present value, we discount by the increase in prices and by the ratio and marginal utilities. The
following period, if the idiosyncratic intermediate input cost is below the threshold, the match will




, otherwise the match will be destroyed and it will
become a vacancy, which has value zero.
Similar present value has a ﬁrm which hires a low skilled worker. It only diﬀers in the fact that
it has to pay its share of the cost of training, t
f
t , which also implies a diﬀe r e n tw a g e .N o t et h a tt h e
continuation value is the same as the one for the high skilled ﬁrm, since the worker becomes high
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Consider now the side of the worker. Denote by Uit and Nit (ηt) the value, in terms of con-
sumption, of being unemployed and being matched with a ﬁrm for a worker of type i ∈ {l,h}.
3.2.3 Value of Unemployment
A high skilled unemployed worker obtains bt utility from home production. If it matches with a
ﬁrm, which happens with probability qw
t , and the intermediate input cost for the ﬁrm is below the
threshold, ¯ ηht+1, he will become a productive worker the following period. If the search process is
not succesful, he may lose the skill, event which occurs with probability λ, and become low skilled
unemployed. If he does not enter into an employment relationship with a ﬁrm and does not lose the
skill, he will remain a high skilled unemployed. Hence, the value of being high skilled unemployed
at period t is:

































Similarly, a low skilled unemployed worker receives utility from the home production. He can meet
a ﬁrm and if the idiosyncratic shock to the ﬁrm is favorable will start producing the following
11period. Otherwise he will remain a low skilled unemployed.4































3.2.4 Value of Employment
A si nt h ec a s eo ft h eﬁrm, the value of a match for a worker is a function of the idiosyncratic shock
ηt. It also depends on the skill of the worker. The value of employment for a high skilled worker
is composed by the high skilled wage, the disutility in terms of consumption from supplying labor
and the continuation value, which is the value of being employed if the match is not destroyed or






























If the worker came from the low skilled unemployment pool, the value is very similar and only


































3.2.5 Surplus of a match
When an employment relationship takes place it creates a surplus which is shared between the ﬁrm
and the worker. The surplus of the match is deﬁned as the sum of the values of a ﬁlled job for
a ﬁrm and a worker minus their outside options, which are the value of a vacancy and the value
of unemployment respectively. Since there is free entry of ﬁrms, the expression for the surplus is
Sit (ηt)=Jit (ηt)+Nit (ηt) − Uit. The sharing rule for the surplus is obtained optimally as a Nash
bargaining process which results in a constant fraction for both parties. If βw is the bargaining
4Note that the threshold for the intermediate input cost which makes the match unproductive is diﬀerent from
the one for the high skilled worker. During the ﬁrst period of the match, the low skilled unemployed needs to be
trained and its cost will lower the acceptable intermediate input cost, that is, the cost which will make the surplus
equal to zero.
12power of the worker, then Nit (ηt) − Uit = βwSit (ηt) and Jit (ηt)=( 1− βw)Sit (ηt). Combining
these two expressions with equations (9) to (15) the surplus in terms of units of consumption for a
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An employment relationship is terminated when the idiosyncratic intermediate input cost to
the ﬁrm is so high that it drives the surplus to zero. This determines the threshold cost above
w h i c hb o t hw o r k e ra n dﬁrm will agree to dissolve the match and search for better options. Using
equation (16) and (17) and equating them to zero we obtain the expressions for the low and high
skill thresholds:























λEt (Ult+1 − Uht+1)
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βw ˜ Slt+1 − βt (Ult+1 − Uht+1)
o
where ˜ Sit is the average surplus for a productive ﬁrm of type i in period t.
3.2.6 Wages
The division of the surplus between ﬁrm and worker yields the wage paid to the employee. The
expressions for the wages paid to a high and low skilled worker are respectively:
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+ bt − Et−2βtEt (Uht+1 − Ult+1)
¸
The worker is compensated for a fraction βw of the production of the ﬁrm net of intermediate
input cost, and for a measure of the saved cost of searching for new matches. He is also compensated
for a fraction (1 − βw) of the disutility from supplying labor, and the forgone home production.
T h el a s tt e r mo ft h ee x p r e s s i o nr e ﬂects the fact that by being hired in a ﬁrm, a high skilled worker
avoids the risk of becoming low skilled and a low skilled increases his value of unemployment once
the match is destroyed.
3.2.7 Optimal Labor



























nht = F (¯ ηht)(nlt−1 + nht−1)+qw
t−1F (¯ ηht)uht−1 (25)
nlt = qw
t−1F (¯ ηlt)ult−1 (26)
1=ult + uht + nlt + nht (27)
143.3 Retailers
There is a continuum of retail ﬁrms which opertate in monopolistic competition. They buy in-
termediate goods from ﬁrms in the intermediate goods sector, transform them into retail goods
through a technology which transform them one to one, and then sell them to the consumers.
Deﬁne the quantity sold of retailer good i as Yit and let Pit be its nominal price. Then the ﬁnal
good purchased by the consumer,Yt, which is a composite of the individual retail goods produced















where ε is the elasticiy of substititution between retail goods and is assumed to be greater than
one.







The aggregate price index, which is deﬁnded as the minimum expenditure necessary to purchase













Retailers are constraint in the way they can change prices. Following Calvo (1983), every period
only a fraction (1 − ϕ) can change prices. The remaing ϕ fraction of them keep the price they had








where ˜ Pt is the price set by the ﬁrms which can change it. A proportion φ of those ﬁrms
are assumed to be ”forward looking” price setters, whereas a proportion 1 − φ set their prices by










Those ﬁrms which look forward to set their prices will choose the price to maximize the expected
























where µε = ε
ε−1 is the ﬂexible price markup, xn










and where Rit,t+s denotes the revenues from good i at thime t+s conditional on the price set at
date t.
”Backward looking” price setters pricing rule is:
Pb






The monetary authority sets the nominal interest rate in the economy. To do so, it follows a Taylor
rule, which implies thatit increases nominal interest rates whenever ouput or inﬂation are above
their steady state levels, which in the case of inﬂation is assumed to be zero. Nominal interest rates


















An equilibrium in this economy is a recursive general equilibrium composed by the set of variables:
- unemployment rates, employment rates and vacancies ult,u ht,n lt, nht,v t,
- values of a match for a ﬁrm, Jht (ηt),J lt(ηt), for a worker, Nht (ηt),N lt(ηt); and value of
unemployment, Uht,U lt,
-w a g e s ,wht (ηt),w lt(ηt), and number of hours of work supplied, Lt,
- intermediate input cost thresholds, ¯ ηht, ¯ ηlt,
- price of intermediate goods, xt,
- output, Yt, consumption, Ct, nominal and real interest rate, rn
t ,r t,i n ﬂation5 πt
which satisfy the following conditions:
5The variable that is solved for is πt =
Pt+1
Pt
, which in the steady state is equal to one, and in log-deviations from
the steady state is πt = pt+1 − pt.
16- ﬂows in the labor market, (23) to (27),
- value functions in the problem of the ﬁrm and the worker, (9) to (15),
- nash bargaining over the surplus to determine wages, (20) and (21), and optimal labor supply,
(22),
- zero surplus conditions, (18) and (19),
- optimal equations in the problem of the household, Euler equation, (3), real interest rate (4),
cash in advance constraint (5), budget constraint, (6) and the aggregate production, (28),
- the equations which determine the price level, (31) to (34),
- and the Taylor Rule (36).
4 Calibration
In this section we explain the parametrization of the model.
The parameters are chosen to match the empirical evidence on the long run values of the
variables in the model, which would correspond to the steady state of the model.
The length of a period is one quarter. The discount factor of the economy is β =0 .98,w h i c h
implies a quarterly real interest rate of 2 percent.
The production function is assumed to be constant returns to scale, so αy =1 . It seems rea-
sonable to think that increases in the amount of hours worked will produce proportional increases
in output. The results of the simulations are robust to changes in this parameter. Setting it equal
to 66 percent, as in a standard production function with capital, does not change the main results.
The steady state labor supply is assumed to be L =1 /3, which implies that on average 8 hours per
day are devoted to work. The last parameter in the production function is the level of technology,
A , which is calibrated using the optimal labor supply (equation (22)) and the steady state value
of consumption implied by the equations in the model.
Home production is assumed to be 20 percent of the ﬁrm’s production, and its steady state
value is b =0 .0045. This parameter alters the volatility of unemployment, but not its persistence.
Following Mortensen & Pissarides (1994), the bargaining power of the worker is set to βw =0 .5.
The parameters in the utility function are γc =0 .5 and γn =1 , which imply decreasing marginal
utility of consumption and quadratic disutility from labor supply.
The matching function is assumed to be constant returns to scales m(ut,v t)=µmuαm
t v1−αm
t .
Following Mortensen & Pissarides (1994) we set αm =0 .5. µm is jointly calibrated with other
parameters and steady state values of variables of the model in the following manner. Following
Cooley & Quadrini (1999), the probability of leaving unemployment is set to 0.7, and the probability
of a vacancy being ﬁlled is assumed to be 0.8. Looking at quarterly data from 1979 to 2003,6 the
unemployment rate is set to 6.25 percent and the proportion of low skilled unemployed to 15 percent
of total unemployment, which is the proportion of long-term unemployed among the US unemployed
population. Using these two probabilities and the steady state ﬂow equations from the model we
can estimate the steady state values loss of skill, λ =0 .2 , destruction rate, 1 − F (¯ ηh)=0 .05,
market tightness, θ =0 .85 , and the scaling parameter in the matching function, µm =0 .68.
6Federal Bank of St Louis FRED II, and CPS.
17Bover, Arellano & Bentolila (2002) estimate the probability of exiting unemployment as a
function of unemployment duration. They estimate that for the Spanish economy this probability
is reduced in half for workers who have been unemployed for a whole year. This estimate is
consistent with the ﬁndings of Jackman & Layard (1991) for the British economy. Therefore we
will assume that, since the matching probability is the same for both types of workers and the
diﬀerence in the transition from unemployment to employment for low skilled workers is marked
by the cost of training, this cost will be set so that the probability of a successful match for a low
skilled worker is half of that for a high skilled.
We set the probability of changing prices for the retailers to 0.85 and the proportion of backward-
looking variables to 0.5, which are both consitent with the estimates of Gali and Gertler (1999).
The steady state mark-up of the intermediate goods ﬁrms is µε =0 .2, which implies an elasticity
of substitution between intermediate goods of ε =6 .






, where the value σ2
z does not aﬀect
the impulse responses of the model. The parameters in the Taylor rule are consistent Clarida, Gali
and Gertler (2000) and set to ρm =0 .85,γ π =1 .5,γ y =0 .5.ϕ r =0 .5578 is chosen so that the
nominal interest rate in the steady state is equal to the real rate.







ψ,w h e r eψ is jointly estimated along with all remaining steady state variables of the
economy through the steady state equilibrium of the model.
Table 1 summarizes the main parameters of the model.
Table 1: Parameters of the Model
Exogenous parameters
β =0 .98 γc =0 .5 γn =1 αy =1
αm =0 .5 βw =0 .5 ϕ =0 .85 φ =0 .5
µε =0 .1 ρm =0 .85 γπ =1 .5 γy =0 .5
Endogenous parameters
λ =0 .2 t =0 .035 k =0 .0028 b =0 .0045
A =0 .046 µm =0 .51 ψ =0 .0045
5R e s u l t s
In this section we compare the results of the simulation of the model with the empirical evidence.
In particular we compare the VAR examined in section 2 and the responses of the model to a 100
basis points increase in the annualized interest rate. Figure 3 and 4 show the results of the VAR
and the model’s simulation. The dotted line represents the respose of the model to the monetary
shock, the solid line the response in the data and the dashed line the 95 percent conﬁdence intervals.
As one can observe in Figures 3 and 4, all the variables respond to the monetary shock in the
expected way. After an increase in the nominal interest rate, consumers face a higher tradeoﬀ
between present and future consumption due to the increased returns on savings. Some of today’s
consumption is delayed to the future, which creates a drop in demand. Hence, output decreases and
18so do proﬁts. Reduced proﬁts will lower the proﬁtability of matches, which decreses the creation
of jobs, along with making some of the previous matches unsustainable, which imply an increase
in destruction of matches. These will reduce employment and increase unemployment. The higher
unemployment population, together with the reduced proﬁts for the ﬁrms, decrease the probability
of unemployed workers to match with ﬁrms. Over time, some of the high skilled workers see their
skills deteriorate and become low skilled, state in which they have even a lower probability of ﬁnding
work. Meanwhile, some of the eﬀects of the initial shock are undone by the monetary authority.
The use of the Taylor rule allows the monetary authority to close the gap in output and in inﬂation
generated by the increase in the interest rates. We can see that high skilled unemployment peaks
before low skilled and converges faster to the steady state. This is due to the fact that some of
the high skilled unemployed workers will become low skilled over time. Now it is more diﬃcult to
ﬁnd a job, and hence high skilled unemployment decreases and low skilled and total unemployment
becomes more sluggish.
Figure 3: Impulse Responses of Output, Inﬂation and Fed. Funds Rate of the US
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19Figure 4: Impulse Responses of Employment and Unemployment of the US Economy
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In general, we can see that the model is able to closely replicate the behavior observed in the
data for the variables analyzed nd in general, all the responses are signiﬁcant, staying within the
95 percent conﬁdence intervals. The model tracks the response of output well, although the second
period response is within the conﬁdence bands. Output peaks in the third period and dies out in
the same period in which the empirical response crosses the zero axes. Although the resonpose of
output in the model lacks some persistence, it improves in this dimension compared with the other
results in the literature. Simulated inﬂation does also a good job, and although it is not as volatile
as in the standard new Keynsian model without a microfunded labor market, the magnitude of its
response is close to the one of the data.
The most interesting part of the results are the responses of the labor market variables. Em-
ployment and the three kinds of unemployment are close to the empirical evidence. Simulated
employment is close to the data in magnitude and in persistence. After a monetary shock employ-
20ment decreases sharply and recovers slowly. As explained before, this is due to the fact that the
decrease in demand reduces proﬁts and it is suﬃc i e n tt oh a v es m a l li d i o s y n c r a t i cs h o c k st om a k e
the match unproﬁtable. Over time proﬁts start increasing again and employment increases along
with the decrease in unemployment.
The unemployment variables are the closest to the data. Most of the magnitudes and the
persistence observed in the VAR are matched by the simulations. Short term unemployment is
the one that matches best the data, especially in the persistence dimension, although the intitial
response is not big enough. We can also see that both short-term and total unemployment slightly
overshoot the response of the data in theit initial response to the shock, but after that they track
well the VAR response
Finally we would like to compare our results with the ones obtained in other recent studies. The
ﬁrst thing to note is that steady state unemployment has been calibrated to be 6.3 percent, which
implies an employment rate of 94.7 percent, in contrast to other studies where they assume a lower
employment rate (Andolfatto (1996), de Haan et al (2000), Trigari (2004)). The reason behind
this assumption in these other papers have to do with workers out of the labor force who, even if
not oﬃcially searching for jobs, end up ﬁnding them and moving back to employment. However
this assumption prevents these papers from studying the response of unemployment after shocks to
the economy, whereas we are able to do so. Another reason why we abstract from the presence of
agents outside the labor force is because, as Flinn and Heckman (1983) point out, unemployment
and out of the labor force are two statistically diﬀerent states for agents. Hence, since agents in
diﬀerent labor force stati behave diﬀerently during the business cycle due to factors such as sex,
age, marital status and education, one should be consider them separetely. The lack of enough
data on workers out of the labor force who are willing to work, together with the fact that the
heterogeneity of the population plays a big role in the searching behavior and in the participation
decisions of the agents (Pissarides(2000)) made us decide to not include this group of workers in
this paper.
However, it seems a natural choice to extend the model to introduce a labor force participation
decisions. This improvement can explain even more the slagguinshness in the response of the real
variables. Workers that have been unemployed for a long time can prefer to leave the labor force
and don’t look for a job. These agents take more time to reenter the labor force and ﬁnd a job
slowing down the process of ricovery of the economy.
Moreover separations in a search and matching model are always eﬃcient, there is no delay
in separations when the surplus is discovered to be zero. This implies that the separation are
istantaneous when the monetary shock hits the economy. In the data it is evident that distruction
takes time as well as creation. It is necessary to introduce a mechanism that can slow down the
distruction mechanism.
6C o n c l u d i n g r e m a r k s
This paper develops a new Keynsian model enriched with a search and matching labor market.
We introduce two kinds of rigidities in the model, Calvo price setting for retail ﬁrms and search
frictions in the labor market. One innovative feature of the model is the inclusion in the labor
21market of two types of unemployed workers, high and low skilled, which transition from the former
the latter when unemployed for an extended period of time.
The claim of the paper is that the loss of skill mechanism helps explain the persistence in the
reaction of real and nominal variables to a monetary policy shock. To prove our claim we estimate
a VAR following Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2000) approach, where we assume that the
moneary policy instrument is the federal fund rate, and we compare the responses of the simulations
of our model with the ones of the data. Analyzing the results, we can see that the model is able to
match the magnitude and the persistence of the responses of output, inﬂation unemployment and
employment to a monetary shock.
These results drive three main conclusions. First, it is necessary to microfund labor markets in
order to have a better undestanding of the economy. Second, the demand side trasmission channel of
monetary shocks can explain the ﬂuctuations in labor market, output and inﬂation. Third, the loss
of skill mechanism is important to better understand the ﬂuctuations of output and unemployment
over the business cycle, especially their perstitence.
Finally, it should be clear from this paper that the study of the heteogenity of the labor force is
important to explain business cycle ﬂuctuations. One such heterogeneity, to be explored in future
research, is the one generated by workers out the labor force, whose participation decision can alter
the dynamics of the economy and hence have an impact on the business cycle.
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